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Abstract
In an interdependent world the risks faced by any one agent depend not
only on its choices but also on those of all others. Expectations about others
choices will inuence investments in risk-management and the outcome can be
sub-optimal for everyone. We model this as the Nash equilibrium of a game and
give conditions for such a sub-optimal equilibrium to be tipped to an optimal one.
We also characterize the smallest coalition to tip an equilibrium, the minimum
critical coalition, and show that this is also the cheapest critical coalition, so that
there is no less expensive way to move the system from the sub-optimal to the
optimal equilibrium. We illustrate these results by reference to airline security
and the control of infectious diseases via vaccination.
Key Words: Nash equilibrium, tipping, cascading, terrorism, security, inter-
dependence, critical coalition.
JEL Classication: C 72, D 80, H 23,
1 Introduction
The problem structure that we study was motivated by examining the risks associated
with terrorism, though as we shall indicate, the concept of interdependent risks that
emerged from this analysis is a very general one. The central issue is behavior in the
face of risks whose magnitude depends on an agents own risk-management strategies
and on those of others. We call this risk class interdependent security (IDS)
problems and use game-theoretic models to characterize their Nash equilibria. What
we are doing here is looking at how individuals and rms manage risks where there
is some likelihood that even if they have invested in protective measures they can be
harmed as a consequence of others not following suit. We are studying what outcomes
result when all the people who are linked in such a system make independent decisions
but are aware of the choices made by others. Using game theoretic models we analyze
the Nash equilibria and how to improve them if they are not e¢ cient.
The risks of terrorism are typically interdependent: the potential consequences
to a rm depend not only on its own choice of security investments but also on the
Heal: Columbia Business School, gmh1@columbia.edu and Kunreuther: The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, kunreuther@wharton.upenn.edu. We are grateful to Vicki Bier and a
referee for valuable comments. Support from NSF grant number CMS-0527598 and the Wharton
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actions of other agents. Failures of a weak link in an interdependent system can
have devastating impacts on all parts of the system. These negative externalities are
an important feature of the IDS problems that will be examined in more detail in
this paper.1 Because interdependence does not require proximity, the antecedents to
catastrophes can be quite distinct and distant from the actual disaster, as in the case
of the 9/11/01 attacks, when security failures at Bostons Logan airport led to crashes
at the World Trade Center (WTC), the Pentagon, and in rural Pennsylvania. The
same was true in the case of the August 2003 power failures in the northeastern US
and Canada, where the initiating event occurred in Ohio, but the worst consequences
were felt hundreds of miles away. Similarly a disease in one region can readily spread
to other areas with which it has contact, as was the case with the rapid spread of
SARS from China to its trading partners, and as may be the case with avian u.
Investing in airline security is a clear example of an IDS problem. Even the
adoption of elaborate security procedures by one air carrier may not mitigate its
risks due to baggage or passenger transfers from other less diligent airlines. Under
some conditions, the added risk from others lax inspections reduces the benets
to diligent airlines from their strict inspections to the point where they can longer
justify incurring these costs. In equilibrium, all actors may consequently fail to invest
in strict security measures.
The explosion of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988 illus-
trates this point. Terrorists in Malta checked a bag containing a bomb on Malta
Airlines, which had minimal security procedures. The bag was transferred at Frank-
furt to a Pan Am feeder line and then loaded onto Pan Am 103 in Londons Heathrow
Airport. The transferred piece of luggage was not inspected at either Frankfurt or
London, the assumption in each airport being that it was inspected at the point of
origin. The bomb was designed to explode above 28,000 feet, a height normally rst
attained on this route over the Atlantic Ocean. Failures in a peripheral part of the
airline network, Malta, compromised the security of a ight leaving from a core hub,
London. Unless PanAm inspected all transferred bags (which until recently was true
only of El Al) there was no way it could have avoided this crash.
1.1 The Nature of IDS Problems
Before laying out our model in detail, we begin with some comments on how this
class of problems relates to the more general literature on games and strategic be-
havior. At the core of an IDS problem is a stochastic external e¤ect: the possibility
of being a¤ected outside of the market by others in the system. That is the essence
of the PanAm 103 case mentioned above, in which a failure to take protection by
one airline imposed a massive risk on other airlines, even if they invested in secu-
rity precautions. External e¤ects are of course not new, though the literature on
stochastic externalities is limited. What is interesting is that a class of apparently
rather di¤erent problems involving stochastic externalities all have the same, rather
specic, mathematical structure, so that a common framework emerges which is what
1The externalities associated with IDS can also be positive as we indicate for the problem of
optimal investment in Research and Development (R&D).
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we call the IDS framework. This encompasses issues as apparently diverse as airline
security, the management of infectious diseases, security in computer networks, and
the payo¤s from investing in R&D. All of these cases have a similar structure. It is
the di¤erences in the details that lead to di¤erent outcomes. The principal purpose
of this paper is to demonstrate similarities and di¤erence betwen these problems.The
results presented here also extend and generalize ndings from earlier papers [16], [8].
At the core of our analysis is a result that we spell out in detail in another more
technical paper [10], which states that there is a close connection between two liter-
atures that have previously been seen as quite unconnected, papers on tipping and
those on supermodularity and strategic complementarity. What the results here il-
lustrate is that supermodularity of a game is close to being a su¢ cient condition for
the equilibria of the game to exhibit the tipping property discussed by Schelling [21],
[22] and many others since his seminal papers. In non-technical terms, the essence
of cases such as the PanAm 103 crash is that the failure of one agent to attend to
security issues reduces the e¤ectiveness of the measures that other agents may take
to improve their security, and so reduces their incentive to take such measures. The
return to one agents investment in security depends on the actions of other agents. If
others do invest, then investing is more attractive, and if they do not, then it is less.
This means that the underlying game exhibits strategic complementarity or super-
modularity (Bulow et al. [2], Milgrom and Roberts [19]). We show below that there
are two natural categories of IDS phenomena: airline security issues show strate-
gic complementarity, whereas fully e¤ective vaccines and R&D investments exhibit
strategic substitutability.
1.2 Outline of the Paper
The next section sets out each of the three classes of IDS problems by indicating the
nature of their Nash equilibria and the implications of this behavior for private and
social welfare. In section 3 we present a general model, of which all these classes
are special cases, and derive results from this general model that can be applied to
each of the classes of IDS problem. These results specify conditions for tipping and
characterize the smallest coalition needed to tip an equilibrium from an ine¢ cient to
an e¢ cient outcome. In our initial treatments the probabilities of a direct loss to an
agent from an external source (e.g. a terrorist) is treated as exogenous. In section 4
we extend the analysis to the case of endogenous probabilities of direct losses. For
example, the likelihood that a terrorist will attack you directly will now depend on
whether or not other agents have taken action to protect themselves. Finally in
sections 5 and 6 we spell out in detail the applications of the IDS framework re two
important types of problems that relate to terrorism: airline security and vaccination
against infectious diseases.
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2 Classes of IDS Problems
Interdependent security (IDS) problems have one common characteristic the deci-
sion by one agent as to whether or not to incur an investment cost impacts the welfare
of other agents, and thus a¤ects their economic incentives to take action themselves.
This section categorizes three classes of IDS problems based on di¤erences in their
Nash equilibria.
2.1 Class 1: Partial Protection with Negative Externalities
Here an agents decision to invest in protection so as to reduce its own risks also de-
creases the risks experienced by others. In other words, the more that agents invest in
preventive measures, the lower are the negative externalities in the system. To take
the example of airline security discussed above, if airlines face terrorist risks and Air-
line 1 invests in a stricter baggage screening system, then all the other airlines benet
because they now have a smaller chance of receiving a transferred bag containing a
bomb. The more airlines invest in baggage security, the greater the reduction in the
risk experienced by everyone in the system.
A situation where an agent knows that there is a chance that others will still
subject it to risk even if it invests in protection is a Class 1 problem. For example, an
apartment owner considering investing in re prevention equipment has to take into
account the possibility that a re from a nearby unprotected apartment will spread to
her unit even if she invests in risk-reducing measures. As the number of apartments
investing in re prevention equipment increases, the likelihood that her apartment
will su¤er a re loss from others decreases. She will then have more of an economic
incentive to invest in protective measures herself. The decision by electric utilities
to take steps to reduce the likelihood of a power failure is also partially determined
by what others do. Each utility knows that there is some chance that an outage in
another part of the country can knock out its power even if it has undertaken its own
preventive measures. (Heal [12]).
2.1.1 Nash Equilibria
As we show more formally in the next section, this class of problems can have one or
multiple Nash equilibria. For the case where there are two equilibria: either all agents
invest in security or none of the agents want to do this, there is then the possibility
of tipping or cascading. In other words, inducing some agents to invest in protection
will lead others to follow suit.
2.1.2 Private and Social Welfare
Whenever there are two Nash equilibria involving everyone or no one investing in
security, then the socially optimal solution will be for everyone to invest. Each agent
will nd that the cost of investing in protection will be justied if it doesnt incur
any negative externalities. Society will be better o¤ as well.
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When there is only a single Nash equilibrium, the investment choices by each
of the individual agents will also be socially optimal in some situations. The most
obvious case is where the costs of protection are su¢ ciently low so that each agent
wants to invest in protection even when all the other agents did not incur these costs.
If investment costs to each agent are very high, then it may be e¢ cient for no one
to incur them; however, there are cases when the costs are su¢ ciently high that each
agent does not want to invest in protection, but it would be better for society if
some or all of them did so. A formal treatment of these and other cases appears in
Sections 3 4, and an illustrative example with respect to airline security is presented
in Section 5.
2.2 Class 2: Complete Protection with Negative Externalities
This class of IDS problems di¤ers from Class 1 in that if an agent invests in security
then it cannot be harmed at all by the actions or inactions of others and reciprocally
it cannot a¤ect others. As an example, a completely e¤ective vaccine will protect a
person against catching a disease from contagious individuals. Prior to vaccination
this person may be susceptible to the disease and could infect others. An airline,
such as El Al, that checks both its own bags and those transferred from other airlines
also illustrates Class 2 behavior.
A related example from the eld of organizational decision-making is where a
division in a rm decides to incur the cost of separating itself from the rest of the
organization (e.g. as a captive) so that it cannot be hurt by other divisions and cannot
harm them if it su¤ers a loss. As more divisions decide to take such action, then this
decreases the likelihood of any unit that is still part of the larger organization being
economically harmed by others. Breaking away in this manner then becomes less
attractive (Kunreuther and Heal [17]).
2.2.1 Nash Equilibrium
For Class 2 problems there is only one type of Nash equilibrium and it can range
from the extremes of either all agents or no agents adopting security, with interme-
diate cases where some agents invest. Since there is only one Nash equilibrium it
is impossible to have tipping or cascading in Class 2 problems. In fact, it is less
attractive for an agent to invest in protection should others then decide to do so.
Consider agent i. As more other agents invest in protection there is a reduction in
the negative externalities that impact on i. This translates into a lower probability
of agent i su¤ering a loss which means that it now has a lower expected benet of
investing in protection
2.2.2 Private and Social Welfare
As in Class 1 problems the number of agents investing at a Nash equilibrium will
not exceed the number that would be socially optimal. Each agent i does not take
into account the negative externalities it is creating in determining whether to invest
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in protection. For the situation where the investment costs are so low that every
agent will want to protect itself, then the Nash equilibrium will be e¢ cient for the
same reasons as it is for Class 1 problems. Similarly, one could have an e¢ cient Nash
equilibrium where no one invests in protection because the costs of taking this action
are so high. On the other hand, there can be a range of parameters where the Nash
equilibrium will not be socially optimal. We discuss the vaccination problem with
complete protection in Section 6 of the paper.
2.3 Class 3: Investments with Positive Externalities
For this class of problems an investment by one agent creates positive externalities,
which make it less attractive for others to follow suit. A rms decision on whether to
incur expenditures for research and development (R&D) will be partially inuenced
by what other rms in the industry are doing. Suppose rm i has decided to invest in
R&D and rm j has to decide whether to do likewise. The higher the probability that
j can benet from the success of i, the less likely it is that j will invest in R&D. Class
3 problems include situations where there is investment in knowledge and agents can
learn from the successful investments by others.
2.3.1 Nash Equilibrium
As is the case for Class 2 problems, there is only a single Nash equilibrium here, but
for a very di¤erent reason. As more agents invest in knowledge, there is a greater
chance that those on the sidelines will be able to benet from their successes (i.e.
there is an increase in positive externalities). For this class of problems you cannot
have tipping and cascading: if any agent convinces others to invest, it will have less
rather than more reason to do so itself.
2.3.2 Private and Social Welfare
A Nash equilibrium is e¢ cient if the only agents who do not invest are those for
whom the expected benets to themselves and others do not exceed the cost of the
investment. There will be situations where the cost of investment is su¢ ciently high
that an agent will not want to incur it even though by doing so other agents in
the system will benet. In this situation there will be fewer agents in equilibrium
investing in knowledge than would be socially optimal. We do not discuss the R&D
problem in more detail in this paper - for details see Heal and Kunreuther [9].
3 The Model
In this paper we present a general model of IDS problems, which covers all three
classes of problems discussed above. We characterize Nash equilibria, show that they
exist, and specify conditions for multiple equilibria. We focus on the case where one
equilibrium involves investment in security by all agents while the other involves no
6
investment by any agent. We then characterize the possibility of tipping and cas-
cading the equilibria from a state of no investment to one of universal investment
in security.2 We dene a critical coalition as one where a change from not investing
to investing by its members will induce all non-members to follow suit. We then
characterize the properties of minimum critical coalitions and show that they are
generically unique and identical to the (unique) cheapest critical coalition. Strategic
complementarity and substitutability (Bulow Geanakoplos and Klemperer [2]) and
supermodularity (Milgrom and Roberts [19]) lie at the heart of some of the phenom-
ena that we study.
We consider a total of A interdependent risk-neutral agents indexed by i. Each
agent is characterized by parameters pi; Li; and ci. Here pi is the probability that
agent i0s actions lead to a direct loss Li: By investing in loss-prevention at a cost of
ci, agent i avoids a direct loss with certainty. Each agent i has a discrete strategy,
Xi, that can takes as values either S or N representing investing and not investing
respectively. If agent i incurs a direct loss, then this may also a¤ect other agents
outcomes. If agent i does not incur a direct loss then it will have no negative impact
on others. We call the loss (or in some cases gain) to others an indirect impact. More
specically qi (fKg; Xi) is the expected indirect loss to agent i when it follows strategy
Xi and the agents in the set fKg are the only ones investing in loss-prevention. A
feature of the IDS problem described above is that an agent who has invested in
prevention cannot cause an indirect impact on others, so in particular if everyone
other than i invests in prevention, then i cannot su¤er indirect impacts. That is if
fKg = f1; 2; ::i  1; i+ 1; ::Ag then qi (fKg; Xi) = 0 whether Xi = S or N .
If agent i invests in prevention and agents in the set fKg are also investing then
the expected loss from this is ci + qi (fKg; S) where the rst term is the direct cost
of investing and the second is the expected cost (or benet if negative) of indirect
impacts imposed by others who do not invest. The expected cost of not investing is
given by piL + (1  pi) qi (fKg; N). Here the rst term is just the expected direct
loss and the second is the expected indirect impact. In this second term the parameter
 2 [0; 1] indicates the extent to which damages are non-additive. If  = 0 then this
second term is piLi + qi (fKg; N), so that the total expected damage sustained by
agent i in the case of non-investment is the sum of the direct and indirect e¤ects. If
however  = 1 then we have piL+(1  pi) qi (fKg; N) which means that the indirect
e¤ects are conditioned on the direct loss not occurring. In this case the damages
from harmful events are non-additive ( i.e., you only die once). A second plane
crashing into one of the towers of the World Trade Center would not have increased
the damage from 9/11 signicantly, and a second bomb placed on PanAm 103 would
likewise have inicted no extra damage.
The agent is indi¤erent between investing and not investing when
ci + qi (fKg; S) = piLi + (1  pi) qi (fKg; N) (1)
2For discussions of tipping and cascading in the literature, see Schelling [21] [22], Dixit [4], Watts
[23] and Gladwell [6]. Easterly [5] provides a brief history of the literature on tipping and tests the
prediction of the model for racial segregation.
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or
ci (fKg) , piLi + (1  pi) qi (fKg; N)  qi (fKg; S) (2)
where ci (fKg) in equation (2) is the cost of investment at which i is just indi¤erent
between investing and not investing: if ci < ci (fKg) then she will invest and vice
versa.
The IDS problems associated with airline security that we rst studied were Class
1 problems [8] [16] where the indirect risk is the same whether agent i invests or not:
qi (fKg; N) = qi (fKg; S) and  = 1 so that
ci (fKg) , pi (Li   qi (fKg; N)) (3)
Since the probability of an indirect loss, qi decreases as another agent is added to
fKg; it follows that ci (fKg) increases in fKg. In words as more agents invest,
then the expected indirect loss falls and the maximum cost at which investment is
justied rises, with ci (;) < ci (fA=ig),3 the latter being the critical cost when all
agents other than i are investing. In this case the game is supermodular (see Milgrom
and Roberts [19]). In Class 2 problems where there is complete protection, such as
deciding whether to get vaccinated, then qi (fKg; S) = 0 whatever the set fKg and
 = 1. This implies that if agent i has invested in protection there is no chance of i
su¤ering an indirect loss from others so that
ci (fKg) , piLi + [1  pi] qi (fKg; N) (4)
Here ci (fKg) decreases with fKg, so that ci (;) > ci (fA=ig) : This reects an
important di¤erence between these two cases, which is the sign with which qi enters
on the RHS (right hand side) of the equation dening ci (fKg) is negative for Class 1
problems and positive for Class 2 problems. In Class 3 problems, such as determining
whether to invest in R&D, those who undertake investments may make a discovery
and there is the possibility of a positive benet from investment Bi; Hence qi is
also positive. In addition, we assume that the likelihood of beneting from someone
elses discovery is independent of whether agent i invests in R&D themselves so that
qi (fKg; N) = qi (fKg; S).
Those who invest in R&D and make a discovery provide spillover benets to others
who may not have invested in R&D but who can use the discovery, so that
ci (fKg) = pi [qi (fKg; S) Bi] (5)
As in Class 2 problems ci (fKg) decreases with fKg, but for di¤erent reasons
agents benet from othersinvestments.
We now investigate properties of the Nash equilibria of this system. We consider
only equilibria in pure strategies.
Denition 1 A Nash equilibrium for the above class of problems is a set of pure
strategies X1; ::::XA such that (1) Xi = S for all i 2 fKg (which may be empty),
(2) if Xi = S then ci (fKg) > ci and (3) if Xi = N then ci (fKg) < ci and (4) if
ci (fKg) = ci then i is indi¤erent between S and N .
3fA=ig means the set A without the element i.
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Theorem 1 For problems in Class 1, a Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. An adaptation of the arguments in Kearns [14]: this theorem also follows
from results in Milgrom and Roberts [19].
There may be equilibria where all agents invest in loss-prevention, those where
none do, and asymmetric pure strategy equilibria where some invest and others do
not. We will illustrate these equilibria in the context of the airline security example
in Section 6. It is also possible that for some parameter values there is more than
one equilibrium as the following proposition indicates:
Theorem 2 There are Nash equilibria at which all agents invest and also Nash
equilibria at which none invest if and only if ci (;) < ci < ci (fA=ig)8i: If both
(N;N; ::; N) and (S; S; :::; S) are Nash equilibria, then (S; S; ; ::; S) Pareto dominates
(N;N; :::; N).
Proof. See appendix.
If there are two equilibria, one with all agents not investing and the other with
everyone investing in protection, then it is obviously interesting to know how we might
tip the ine¢ cient (N;N:::::N) equilibrium to an e¢ cient (S; S; :::::S) equilibrium.
Next we look into the possibility of tipping the non-investment equilibrium.
3.1 Tipping
In this section we explore the possibility that a game with two (or more) equilibria
may be tipped from an ine¢ cient to an e¢ cient equilibrium by a change in the
strategy choices of a small number of players. We show that this is possible for class
1 IDS problems, those that exhibit strategic completmentarity. In this case a decision
by, for example, one airline to invest improves the incentives for others to follow suit.
It should be intuitively clear that if the mutual reinforcement e¤ect is strong enough,
then this could begin a process that will lead all agents to change.
Denition 2 Let Xi = N8i be a Nash equilibrium. A critical coalition CC for this
equilibrium is a set fMg of agents such that if Xi = S8i 2 fMg then cj (fMg) 
cj8j =2 fMg.
In words, a critical coalition is one with the property that if all of its members
invest then for all other agents the best response is also to invest.
Denition 3 A minimum critical coalition MCC is a critical coalition of which no
subset is also a critical coalition.4
We are interested in critical coalitions in which there is no redundancy and all
agents in the coalition are needed to tip the other agents.
4See Heal [13] for an earlier use of the idea of a minimum critical coalition in a di¤erent context,
unconnected with tipping.
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Denition 4 A smallest critical coalition SCC is a minimum critical coalition with
the property that no other critical coalition contains fewer members.
There can be several minimum critical coalitions - we are interested in the smallest
one. Dene
qji (fKg; N) = qi (fK=jg; N)  qi (fKg; N)  0; j 2 fKg (6)
This represents the change in the expected indirect loss to agent i, who does not
invest in loss-prevention, when agent j joins the set fKg of agents who are already
investing in loss-prevention. For the remainder of this section we make the following
assumption:
Assumption A1: qji (fKg; N) is independent of i: qji (fKg; N) , qj (fKg; N)8i
This implies that indirect e¤ects are symmetrically distributed across agents. Also
dene qji (;; S) = qi (;; S)  qi (j; S) and qji (;; N) = qi (;; N)  qi (j;N) and make the
additional assumption that
Assumption A2: qji (;; S) = qji (;; N) = qji (;) = qj (;)
This indicates that the indirect impact of a change of strategy by agent j on another
agent does not depend on the other agents strategy.
Finally, we shall need the following assumption:
Assumption A3 : The ranking of agents j = 1::A by the indirect e¤ects they
generate qj (fKg) , is independent of fKg
This says in intuitive terms that if agent 1 creates the largest negative externalities
when agents in the set fKg are investing in loss-prevention, then agent 1 creates
more externalities than any other agent no matter who is in the set investing in loss
prevention.
Theorem 3 Let Xi = N 8i be a Nash equilibrium. If a smallest critical coalition
exists for this equilibrium then for some integer k it consists of the rst k agents when
agents are ranked in decreasing order of qj (;).
Proof. See the Appendix
Corollary 1 There is a smallest critical coalition only if  > 0; i.e., if there is some
degree of non-additivity of damages.
Corollary 2 A smallest critical coalition is unique if the values of the quantities
qj (fKg) are di¤erent for di¤erent agents j.
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Proof. This follows immediately: the only way a SCC could not be unique is if
qj (fKg) = qf (fKg) for some j; f < L, which is ruled out by the assumption.
These results imply that a SCC is easily characterized and that in general there
is only one SCC, if the terms qj (fKg) will di¤er. Note that assumption A2 simplies
the formula but is not necessary for a result of this type: without it we would have
to rank agents by
 
qj (S)  (1  ) qj (N), which simplies to qj (S) if  = 1 and to
qj (S)  qj (N) if  = 0.
The key policy implications of our results on critical coalitions is that an equilib-
riium where no one invests in security may be converted to one with full investment
by persuading a subset of the agents to change their policies. Tipping assures us
that it is only necessary to persuade the subset to alter their behavior to convince
all agents to invest in protection. The least expensive way of changing equilibrium
is therefore likely to involve providing incentives for a critical coalition to change its
behavior, which will then tip the entire system.5
4 Endogenous Risks of Direct Losses
In the above analyses the direct risks faced by the agents are assumed to be inde-
pendent of their behavior. In reality if some agents are known to be more security-
conscious than others, they are presumably less likely to be terrorist targets. There
is a resemblance here to the problem of theft protection: if a house announces that
it has installed an alarm, then burglars are likely to turn to other houses as targets
[16]. In the case of airline security, terrorists are more likely to focus on targets which
are less well protected, so that pi depends on whether or not agent i invests in secu-
rity. This is the phenomenon of displacement or substitution, documented in Sandler
[20]. Keohane and Zeckhauser [15] also consider the implication of endogenous ter-
rorist risks, focusing on ways to controlling the stock of terrorist capital and curbing
the ow into the terrorist organizations. Bier, Oliveros and Samuelson [1] develop a
strategic model for determining how much a defender should allocate to each location
to defend against possible attacks, knowing that the likelihood that a terrorist will
attack a specic location decreases as more resources are allocated to protecting it.
To examine the impact of endogenous risks on Nash equilibria we focus here on
Class 1 problems and the case of airline security. We assume that the risk faced by
an airline that does not invest in stricter inspections increases as the fraction of other
airlines investing in such measures increases. In other words, if more airlines from a
given population invest in security, then those who do not take similar actions become
more vulnerable. Formally let  be the number of airlines investing in security, i.e.
the number in the set fK g of airlines that are investing. The relevant probabilities
facing those rms not investing in security, pi () ; are now increasing in :
Now return to equation (3), dening the cost of investment that marks the bound-
ary between a rm i investing and not investing in security when no other rm invests
and pi are exogenous. Assume as before that qi (fKg; N) = qi (fKg; S) and  = 1 so
5Heal and Kunreuther [10] provide conditions for nding the smallest set of agents that can tip
all the other agents.
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that
ci (fKg) , pi () [Li   qi (fKg; N)] (7)
In this expression qi (fKg; N) depends on  since the likelihood of airline i being
impacted by others depends how many airlines are investing in security. To under-
stand how a change in  will a¤ect ci (fKg) ; take the rst di¤erence of the right hand
side of (7) with respect to  :
ci (fKg)

= [Li   qi(fKg; n)] pi

  piqi

(8)
Here  is the di¤erence operator and pi > 0 by assumption, and the coe¢ cient
associated with this term is the di¤erence between the direct and expected indirect
losses, which we assume to be positive. The rst term on the RHS of (8) is therefore
positive under this assumption. The term qi measures the impact of a change in
the number investing on the total expected indirect impact on rm i, a non-investor.
We assume this to be negative: more agents investing in security means less exposure
to indirect e¤ects. This certainly seems reasonable for the airline case.
Theorem 3 on tipping is thus relevant to a model with endogenous probabilities.
With the above assumptions, c

i (fKg)
 > 0 in (8) and an increase in the number of
agents investing in security will raise the threshold cost level for the remaining agents
to invest, thus making it more likely that they will also invest. It should now be easier
for a coalition to tip the other rms into investing for the following reason: not only
does a decision by a rm to invest reduce the externalities, but it also increases the
risk that a rm that did not invest in security will become a terrorist target.
Theorem 2 which shows that there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for
the case of exogenous probabilities also holds for the case of endogenous probabilities
given the above assumptions. For the argument to work we require that it still be
the case that a rm is most likely to choose S when all others are also choosing S
and that if in such a situation it chooses N then it will always choose N . But this is
implied by the assumption that the total externality imposed on a rm decreases as
the number of other rms investing increases.
5 Class 1 Example: Airline Security6
This section provides an analysis of Nash equilibria for Class 1 problems by focusing
on airline security. We analyze the relationship between private and social welfare
and illustrate tipping and the related phenomenon of cascading through numerical
examples coupled with a geometric framework to provide intuition for these results.
There are 2 separate airlines. Let rij be the probability that on any trip a bag
containing a bomb is loaded onto airline i and is then transferred to airline j and
explodes on j. If i = j, we have the probability that an airline loads a bag with a
bomb and this explodes on its own plane. Each airline can either invest in a security
6This section is based on material that appeared in [8].
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system S at a cost per trip of ci > 0 or not invest N: Security systems are assumed to
be completely e¤ective so that they eliminate the chance of a bomb coming through
the airlines own facility. In the event that a bomb explodes on a plane the loss is
L > 0. The initial income of an airline is Y > ci 8i.
This framework gives rise to the following payo¤matrix showing the outcomes for
the four possible combinations of N and S. If both airlines invest in security systems
then their costs per trip are just their investment costs, ci. If A1 invests and A2
does not, then A1 incurs an investment cost c1 plus the expected loss from a bomb
transferred from A2 that explodes on A1 (i.e., r21L), while A2 has an expected loss
from a bomb loaded and exploding on its plane, r22L: If neither invests then A1 has
an expected loss from a bomb loaded and exploding on its own plane r11L minus
the expected loss from a bomb transferred from A2 that explodes on A1 (i.e., r21L)
conditioned on there being no explosion from a bomb loaded by A1 itself (1  r11).
A2s payo¤ is determined in a similar fashion.
A1=A2 S N
S  c1 c2  c1 r21L;  r22L
N  r11L; c2 r12L  r11L  (1  r11) r21L; r22L  (1  r22) r12L
Within this framework assumptions A1 to A3 are always satised, as is the con-
dition ci (;) < ci < ci (A)8i of theorem 1. We also have qi (fKg; N) = qi (fKg; S)
and  = 1.
Choosing to invest in security measures is a dominant strategy for 1 if and only if
c1 < r11L and c1 < r11 [1  r21]L (9)
The condition that c1 < r11L is clearly what we would expect from a single airline
operating on its own. The tighter condition that c1 < r11 [1  r21]L reects the risk
imposed by a rm without security on its competitor: this is the risk that dangerous
baggage will be transferred from an unsecured airline to the other.
The nature of the Nash equilibrium in the interdependent security model naturally
depends on the parameters. From the payo¤ matrix it is clear that (S; S) is a Nash
equilibrium if ci < riiL and is a dominant strategy if ci < riiL (1  rji) where i and
j are 1 or 2. (N;N) is a Nash equilibrium if ci > riiL (1  rji) and a dominant
strategy if ci > riiL: From these inequalities we note that (S; S) and (N;N) are
both Nash equilibria if riiL (1  pji) < ci < riiL: this is consistent with theorem
2, as riiL (1  rji) = ci (;) and riiL = ci (A  i). Finally if c1 > r11L but c2 <
r22L (1  r12) then (N;S) is a Nash equilibrium, and if 1 and 2 are interchanged
then the equilibrium is (S;N) : This conguration of Nash equilibria is summarized
in Figure 1. Note that if c1 = c2 then we are on the diagonal of gure 1 and the only
possible equilibria are (S; S), either (S; S) or (N;N) ; and (N;N) : In this case mixed
equilibria are not possible, as stated in our earlier paper [16].
Figure 1 enables one to determine when the Nash equilibrium also is socially
optimal. From the proof of Theorem 2 we know that when both (S; S) and (N;N)
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Nash and
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S,N
N,S
S,S is Nash
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S,S is Nash
equilibrium
N,N is Nash
N,N is Nash
c1
c2
r 11[1-r 21]L
r 22[1-r 12]L
r 11L
r 22L
Figure 1: Nash equilibria as a function of c1 and c2:
equilibria coexist the former Pareto dominates the latter. To be precise we know
from the proof of Theorem 2 that (S; S) Pareto dominates (N;N) whenever
ci < piLi + (1  pi)qi (;; N) (10)
In the present context this simplies to
ci < riiL+ L (1  rii) rji (11)
In terms of gure 1, this means that the area in which (S; S) Pareto dominates is a
rectangle that includes but is greater than the region that is the product of the two
intervals [0; r11L] and [0; r22L]. So this includes all of the regions in which (S; S) is
a Nash equilibrium, and parts of the regions in which (S;N) ; (N;S) and (N;N) are
equilibria. In particular, whenever (S; S) is an equilibrium, then it is e¢ cient.
5.1 Tipping
Consider three airlines, and let r11 = r12 = r13 = r21 = r22 = r23 = 0:1, r31 = r32 =
0:3; r33 = 0:2, L = 1000 and c1 = c2 = 85; c3 = 200: The Nash equilibria for this
problem are depicted in gures 2 and 3. In this setting
c1 (;) = c2 (;) = r11L (1  r21   (1  r21) r31) = 63
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As c1 = c2 = 85 > c1 (;) = c2 (;) = 63; neither rm 1 nor rm 2 will invest in security
if rm 3 is not investing. We have that
c3 (;) = r33L(1  r23   (1  r23) r13) = 162
and so rm three will not invest (as c3 = 200) and (N;N;N) is the Nash equilibrium.
If rm 3 does not invest, then not investing is a dominant strategy for both the other
rms for any ci > 63; i = 1; 2.
Suppose that airline 3 is required to invest in security by either an airline asso-
ciation or the federal government. It now imposes no externality on the other rms
and so does not a¤ect their decisions. To understand the choices of rms 1 and 2 we
simply have to apply inequality (9), which gives a critical cost level of 90; meaning
that investment will now be a dominant strategy when the cost is less than 90: Since
c1 = c2 = 85; we see that after rm 3 has changed strategy from N to S the dominant
strategy for both rms 1 and 2 has changed from not investing to investing. Airline
3 therefore has the capacity to tip the equilibrium from not investing to investing by
changing its policy.
The tipping phenomenon is shown geometrically in gures 2 and 3. These are
similar to gure 1 above, showing the sets of fc1; c2g values corresponding to di¤erent
equilibrium types. The key point in seeing tipping geometrically is that this diagram
for rms 1 and 2 depends on what rm 3 does. A change by 3 alters the entire
equilibrium diagram for the other two rms.7 When rm 3 does not invest, as in
gure 2, not investing is a dominant strategy for the other two rms as their cost
point (85; 85) lies in the quadrant bounded below by (75; 75) : When rm 3 changes
and invests, then the whole diagram for the other rms alters, as reected in gure 3.
The region in which investing is a dominant strategy is now greatly enlarged because
of the removal of the externalities generated by 3 and includes the point (85; 85)
representing the investment costs of rms 1 and 2.
We now compute the expected prots of each airline when none of the airlines are
investing in security. The expected loss for airline 1 (and also for 2) at an equilibrium
where no rms invest is
r11L+ (1  r11) [r21L+ (1  r21) r31L]
which is 433; so that its expected prot is Y  433: For airline 3 this value is Y  352:
When airline 3 is forced to invest in security then the prots for airlines 1 and 2 are
each given by Y   85 and prots for airline 3 are Y   200: Hence the prots of each
of the three rms are increased when the industry moves from the equilibrium with
no investment to a situation with all investing. In fact rms 1 and 2 could protably
pay rm 3 to switch from not investing to investing.
5.2 Cascading
Our model can also give rise to the phenomenon of cascading (see also Dixit [4]), which
refers to a situation where when one agent changes its policy, this leads another to
7We are really looking at a three-dimensional version of gure 1, and the diagrams for rms 1
and 2 are slices through this for di¤erent strategy choices for rm 3:
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c1
c2
90, 90
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in (N,N) region
Equilibrium in DS is
(S,S)
Figure 2: Equilibria for rms 1 and 2 when 3 does not invest.
Equilibrium in DS is
(S,S)
75, 75
63, 63
c1
c2
90, 90
100, 100
Equilibrium in DS is (N,N)
Actual costs (85, 85)
in (S,S) region
Figure 3: Equilibria for rms 1 and 2 when 3 invests and imposes no externalities.
In this case (85; 85) is in the region in which investing is a dominant strategy.
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follow suit. The fact that two agents have changed now persuades a third to follow,
and when the third changes policy this creates the preconditions for a fourth to do so,
and so on. The analogy with a row of dominoes is compelling: the rst knocks down
the second, which knocks down the third, and so on. To see how this can happen in
our model, suppose that we have a Nash equilibrium at which all airlines choose N
and assume in addition we can number rms 1; 2; 3; ::: so that the following conditions
are satised:
 When 1 switches from N to S then 2s best strategy changes from N to S but
no other rms best strategy changes
 When 1 and 2 have switched from N to S then 3s best strategy changes from
N to S and no other rms best strategy changes.
 When 1, 2 and 3 have switched from N to S then 4s best strategy changes
from N to S and no other rms best strategy changes.
or in general
 When 1; 2; 3; :::; J have switched from N to S then (J + 1)s best strategy
changes from N to S and no other rms best strategy changes.
If such an ordering of the rms exists then if rm 1 switches from N to S; it will
start a cascade in which 2 changes followed by 3 then by 4 etc. etc. We can readily
modify the numerical example above to illustrate this cascading process. Specically,
keep the probabilities as above and let c1 = 95 as before but c2 = 85: Then it
is clear from gures 2 and 3 that (c1; c2) is in the region where (N;N) are the
dominant strategies when 3 does not invest but also is in the region where (N;S)
is the equilibrium when 3 does invest (see also gure 1). So in this case when 3
changes from N to S this causes 2 to change from not investing to investing as well.
But once rms 2 and 3 are investing, rm 1 is e¤ectively on its own and will invest
if c1 < r11L = 100; which is satised. So when 2 follows 3 and changes from not
investing to investing it will cause 1 to follow suit, generating a cascade.
6 Class 2 Problems: Vaccination8
As indicated in Section 2:2, Class 2 problems are ones where an agent who invests in
protection obtains complete protection and cannot be contaminated by others. In this
section we illustrate the nature of the Nash equilibrium for this class of problems by
focusing on whether to be vaccinated or not. We also show the number of individuals
who choose to be vaccinated may not be socially optimal.
Catching diseases normally conveys immunity, so that you can only catch the
disease once: damages are non-additive. Secondly, the risk that each person faces
depends on whether others are vaccinated - security is interdependent. You can catch
8For more details on the vaccination problem see [11].
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the disease from the environment - i.e. from a non-human host - or from another
person. If everyone else is vaccinated then the remaining person faces only the risk
of catching the disease from a non-human host. Because of this, the incentive that
any agent faces for vaccination is reduced as more other people are vaccinated: their
vaccination reduces the risk to which he or she is exposed and so reduces the benets
of vaccination. Hence we have a case of strategic substitutability.
Assume that it costs c to be vaccinated: this may reect a combination of cash
costs, psychological costs and possible adverse reactions. If someone catches the
disease then the total cost to them is L (for loss). There are non-human hosts for
the infectious agent, so that one can be infected even if no one else is. Cholera is a
disease of this type: cholera pathogens are resident in the environment even when the
disease is not present in humans. The alternative case can be formulated as a special
case of this more general situation. Smallpox appears to be in the second category, a
disease that is not endemic in the environment, although a terrorist group could play
the role played by non-human hosts in the other case. In the absence of deliberate
infection by an enemy, we could not normally catch smallpox unless someone else
were already infected.
For this example agents may choose to be vaccinated (V ) or not to be vaccinated
(NV ). If you are vaccinated then you will not be infected,9 so qi (K;S) = 0 whatever
the value of K. Dene r to be the probability of catching the disease even if no
one else has it: this is the environmental risk of the disease, the background risk
(positive for cholera and zero for smallpox). Let q denote the chance of catching the
disease from a non-human source and infecting another susceptible person. It is only
possible to catch the disease once, so that  = 1. In the two person case we have
the following payo¤ matrix to the strategies of being vaccinated (V ) and not being
vaccinated (NV ):
V NV
V  c; c  c; rL
NV  rL; c  rL  (1  r)qL; rL  (1  r)qL
If both are vaccinated then each incurs a the cost of vaccination,  c. If only
one is vaccinated then her cost is  c; and the other has an expected loss  rL: the
latter person runs no risk of infection from the vaccinated person who by assumption
cannot transmit the disease.
In the case in which neither chooses to be vaccinated, an individual has an ex-
pected direct loss of  rL, plus an expected indirect loss from infection by the other
person  qL, which only occurs if you have not already been infected, an event with
probability (1  r). From this payo¤ matrix it is clear that:
1. When c < rL, (V; V ) is a Nash equilibrium.
2. For rL < c < rL+ (1  r) qL; both (N;V ) or (V;N) are equilibria, and
9 In fact many vaccines are not fully e¤ective. For example, most vaccines against inuenza convey
only partial immunity to the disease.
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3. For rL+ (1  r) qL < c then (NV;NV ) is the equilibrium.
So as the cost of vaccination rises, we have equilibria with both people being vacci-
nated, one being vaccinated, and neither being vaccinated. The critical values of c at
which the equilibrium changes are the expected loss from infection if the other person
is vaccinated (rL), and the expected loss from infection if she is not (r + (1  r) q)L.
Here (r + (1  r) q) is the probability of infection if neither is vaccinated. This same
structure persists as we consider situations with more people.
If the Nash equilibrium is (V; V ) then this strategy maximizes social welfare be-
cause c < rL. For all other cases, if the costs of vaccinating are su¢ ciently low then it
will be socially optimal to vaccinate more individuals. In the above 2 person simplied
example, consider the case where both (N;V ) or (V;N) are equilibria, in which case
rL < c < rL+(1  r) qL. In this case if the other person were forced to be vaccinated,
then the total costs would be Costs(V; V ) = 2c < Costs(N;V ) = c+ rL+ (1  r) qL
by the nature of the cost inequality for(N;V ) or (V;N) to be a Nash equilibrium. So
the outcome would not be socially optimal.
7 Conclusions
Interdependence is a widespread phenomenon with risk-management decisions: air-
lines, electric utilities, public health and R&D amongst others are elds in which the
risk that I face depends on what you choose, and vice versa. This can lead to strategic
complementarity or substitutability. We have specied three classes of IDS problems
and developed a general framework for analyzing them from a game-theoretic per-
spective, drawing on the complementarity or substitutability between agentsstrate-
gies. We have illustrated the challenges in developing protective strategies for dealing
with terrorism that illustrate Class 1 problems (airline security) and Class 2 problems
(vaccinations).
An interesting feature of Class 1 problems, where investment in prevention only
provides partial protection and where investments are strategically complementary,
is the possibility of tipping and cascading. Tipping occurs when changes in the
behavior of a small number of players lead all the rest to change their strategies, thus
transforming the equilibrium radically. In such situations, one or a few players are
likely to have great leverage over the system as a whole. In our 3-agent numerical
example on airline security, a change of strategy from N to S by one airline leads the
other two airlines to also invest in prevention. We also used the example to illustrate
cascading, where a change of strategy by one agent causes the second to change which
induces a third to invest in prevention until all parties have changed their strategy,
a classical domino e¤ect".
The equilibria for IDS problems are often ine¢ cient because of negative external-
ities. The social return to an investment in protection and in disease-prevention, is
greater than the private return and this can lead to under-investment. The policy
implications are interesting: it may be that the private sector through some coordi-
nating mechanism (e.g. a trade association) can induce all rms in the industry to
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invest in cost-e¤ective preventative measures. Or the government can identify those
inuentials or opinion leaderswho form a minimum critical coalition and per-
suade them to change their positions, leading others to then adopt similar measures.
As noted in our illustrative airline security example, the tax needed to inuence the
minimum critical coalition is much less than that needed to inuence all players.10
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First note that ci (fA=ig) > ci (;) for the Class 1 IDS problems, so the
conditions of the proposition are not vacuous. If ci > ci (;) then Xi = N8i is an
equilibrium because it satises the denition with fKg = ;. And if ci < ci (fA=ig)
then Xi = S8i is an equilibrium with fKg = fAg. Conversely if Xi = N8i is
an equilibrium then ci > ci (;)8i and if Xi = S8i is an equilibrium then ci <
ci (fA=ig)8i. This proves the rst part of the proposition.
The proof of the second part is as follows. From equation (1), Pareto domination
by the (S; S; ::; S) equilibrium is equivalent to
ci < piLi + (1  pi)qi (;; N) (12)
where the left hand side (LHS) of (12) reects the costs to each agent i if all agents
invest in prevention and the RHS of (12) is the cost to agent i if no-one invests in
prevention, since qi (fKg; S) = 0 when fKg = fAg. The existence of both (S; S; ::; S)
and (N;N; :::::N) as equilibria implies that
ci < c

i (fA=ig) = piLi + (1  pi)qi (fA=ig; N)]  qi (fA=ig; S)] (13)
The RHS of (13) is less than the RHS of (12) because qi (;; N) > qi (fA=ig; N)
and qi (fA=ig; S)  0 so that (13) implies (12). This completes the proof of the
proposition.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Recall from (2) that ci (fKg) = fqi (fKg; N)  qi (fKg; S)g+pi (Li   qi (fKg; N))
and dene
cji = fqi (j;N)  qi (j; S)g+ pi (Li   qi (j;N))  (14)
fqi (;; N)  qi (;; S)g   pi (Li   qi (;; N)) (15)
= (1  ) fqi (j;N)  qi (;; N)g+ fqi (;; S)  qi (j; S)g (16)
Using A3, we see that for fKg = f1; 2; 3; :::kg to form a critical coalition (where
agents are ranked in decreasing order of qj (;)) it must be the case that k is the rst
integer such that
j=kX
j=1
cji  ci   ci (;)8i > k (17)
10 In [16] we examine private and/or public sector policy interventions that could be used to correct
the underinvestment. These include taxes, subsidies, regulations, third party inspections and the use
of associations and other coordinating mechanisms. Lakdawalla and Zanjani [18] also investigate
ways in which the public sector can be involved in reducing the negative externalities.
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which can be written as
j=kX
j=1
 
qj (;; S)  (1  ) qj (;; N)  ci   ci (;)8i > k (18)
By (??) this can be simplied to

j=kX
j=1
qj (;)  ci   ci (;)8i > k (19)
As there can be no smaller coalition that is critical, this completes the proof.
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